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To Have and to Hold, for Richer or Richer:
Premarital Agreements in the Comparative
Context
Margaret Ryznar* and Anna Stępień-Sporek**
INTRODUCTION
The premarital agreement,1 which permits prospective
spouses to plan for divorce, may well be the world’s most
unromantic document.2 Envisioning the end of a marriage not
yet begun, prospective couples must divide property not yet
acquired. They must select a legal framework governing their
marriage and divorce. Lawyers are often invited to participate in
the negotiations, fuelling prospective spouses in their demands.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, many people prefer to avoid
requesting a premarital agreement, despite judicial and social
gains in the acceptance of such agreements.
However, odds do not favor lifelong marriages3 and when
divorce ensues, many people resent their divorce settlements.4
Premarital agreements will therefore always have an important
role in many engagements, particularly when one of the partners
* J.D., Notre Dame Law School; M.A., Jagiellonian University; B.A., University of
Chicago. The authors would like to thank Meagan Tom and her colleagues on Chapman
Law Review for phenomenal editorial assistance.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Gdańsk School of Law, Poland. Doctor
and Master of Law, University of Gdańsk.
1 For a precise definition of the premarital agreement in United States law, also
known as a prenuptial or antenuptial agreement, see infra Part I.A. In Europe, the term
“marital agreement” is used to describe both premarital agreements and marital
agreements, but not agreements made by spouses after a divorce. See infra Part II.
2 Most unromantically, premarital agreements signal divorce to many prospective
spouses. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors,
61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1441 (2008) (suggesting premarital agreements signal the
possibility of divorce); Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 VA. L. REV. 1989, 2021
(2000) (suggesting premarital agreements signal distrust); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1667, 1718 (2008) (identifying, as a classic example of signaling behavior, the lack of a
prenuptial agreement as a means of signaling love prior to a marriage).
3 In 2003, there was one divorce for every two marriages. National Vital Statistics
Reports: Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2003, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, (United States Department of Health and Human
Services), June 10, 2004, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/
nvsr52_22.pdf.
4 See infra notes 67, 78, and 81 for examples of potential inequalities of bargaining
power between spouses.
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has noteworthy assets.
For example, Hollywood actress
Catherine Zeta-Jones reportedly contracted with actor Michael
Douglas to receive $2.8 million per year of marriage upon
divorce, and if she proved his infidelity, for an additional $5
million.5 Meanwhile, the premarital agreement between actress
Nicole Kidman and singer Keith Urban would purportedly pay
Urban about $640,000 for every year that he spent with Kidman,
unless he used illegal drugs during the marriage, in which case
he would receive nothing.6 Finally, in light of the public
speculation on his marital fidelity, golfer Tiger Woods reportedly
amended his premarital agreement, contracting to pay his wife
significantly more upon divorce if she refrained from filing for
divorce in the immediate future.7
These illustrations underscore the inordinate power of
premarital agreements in shifting wealth between spouses and
discouraging undesirable marital behavior. They also symbolize,
to people around the world, the typical use of the premarital
agreement: to divide property upon divorce. The simplicity of
this popular understanding, however, belies the complexity of
premarital agreements. In essence, the premarital agreement
permits a circumvention of the statutory defaults governing
spouses’ rights and responsibilities not only during divorce or
death, but also during marriage. Furthermore, when legislation
or case law alters these rights and responsibilities,8 premarital
agreements protect spouses from being governed by the
unexpected changes in the law.

5 Jae-Ha
Kim, Split Ends, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 29, 2004,
http://jaehakim.com/articles/lifestyles/prenup.htm.
6 Ten
Craziest Prenuptial Agreements, MYWEDDING.COM, http://www.my
wedding.com/blogs/mywed/2008/02/ten-craziest-prenuptial-agreements.html (last visited
Oct. 14, 2009).
7 See, e.g., Bill Zwecker, Woods, Wife In Intense Marriage Counseling, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.suntimes.com/entertainment/zwecker/1916410,
zwecker-tiger-woods-marriage-elin-prenup-120209.article.
8 One example of shifting divorce laws is found in England. See Margaret Ryznar,
All’s Fair in Love and War: But What About in Divorce? The Fairness of Property Division
in American and English Big Money Divorce Cases, N.D. LAW REV. (forthcoming 2010).
Nonetheless, premarital agreements are still rare in England; currently only 2% of
married and divorced people in the United Kingdom have them. Divorce Lawyers Braced
for Busiest Week Ever, TIMES ONLINE, January 5, 2009, http://business.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article5450552.ece. One reason for the rarity of such
agreements might be their unenforceability, although courts often defer to them in
determining appropriate ancillary relief. However, the enforceability of premarital
agreements may soon be guaranteed in England, particularly if that is the
recommendation of the influential Law Commission. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the
Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About
Marriage, 40 WM AND MARY L. REV. 145, 150 n.18 (1998); Pre-nuptial and Post-nuptial
Agreements,
LAW
COMMISSION,
available
at
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/
marital_property.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2009).
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However, premarital agreements are not without their
problems. Their enforceability in the United States is subject to
procedural and substantive review.9 They also universally raise
public policy issues with regard to the meaning of fairness and
the limits on freedom of contract. Such issues heighten in the
case of mobile couples, which include those who move both interstate10 and internationally.11 Given these issues, it is beneficial
to consider the premarital agreement in the comparative context.
This is particularly true as state courts and legislatures continue
to encounter and address the unresolved issues surrounding
premarital agreements.
Although England and the United States have similar
understandings of such agreements,12 the meaning and
consequences of premarital agreements in continental Europe
markedly differ from the Anglo-American common law tradition,
heightening the opportunity for a comparative study. However,
while the European approach inherently offers significant insight
into the purpose, limits, and effects of premarital agreements,
this approach is not as well-known—even to many Europeans—
as the American approach, made so famous through Hollywood
examples.
This Article therefore endeavors to consider and develop the
notion of the premarital agreement in the comparative law
context, addressing some of the universal issues surrounding
premarital agreements, as well as the particular nuances of
certain regulatory frameworks governing this type of agreement.
Part I begins by exploring premarital agreements in American
law, while Part II reviews the European approach to such
agreements, focusing on Poland’s representative approach, but
also considering the approaches of France, Germany, and
Switzerland. Part III draws lessons from a comparison of these
various approaches, concluding that much of the distinction
between American and European law on premarital agreements
stems from the differing limits placed on the prospective spouses’
freedom of contract. Part III also considers the desirable level of
freedom of contract, the ideal characteristics of the regulatory
framework of premarital agreements, and, finally, the popularity
of such agreements.
See infra Part I.D.1 for further discussion.
See infra note 49.
International dating and marriage has been facilitated by online dating and mail
order bride programs. Premarital agreements in such cases can be particularly one-sided.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shirilla, 89 P.3d 1, 2–4 (Mont. 2004).
12 But see supra note 8 (noting the unenforceability of premarital agreements in
England, which is different from the enforceability of such agreements in the United
States).
9

10
11
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I. PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, family law has traditionally remained
in the domain of the states.13 Therefore, American law regarding
premarital agreements has developed independently in each
state, whether by statute or case law. Even with the introduction
of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (1983) (“UPAA”), the
law on premarital agreements is far from uniform.
The premarital agreement in the United States has been
rapidly developing since 1970, when courts began abandoning
their public policy reasons against enforcing such agreements.14
Posner v. Posner15 became one of the first cases permitting the
enforceability of premarital agreements in the 1970’s, while the
UPAA prompted state legislatures to begin drafting statutes on
the subject in the 1980’s.
Even today, premarital agreements are subject to certain
procedural and substantive limits before a court will uphold their
validity. Such agreements also raise important questions of
fairness, which state law strives to resolve. Before turning to
these questions, however, this Article reviews the brief history
and current meaning of premarital agreements in the United
States.
A. Definition of Premarital Agreement
At the outset, it is important to define the American
premarital agreement, also known as a prenuptial or antenuptial
agreement, because its meaning and consequences differ notably
from those of the European marital agreement.16
The UPAA defines a premarital agreement as “an agreement
between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage
and to be effective upon marriage.”17 This definition, however,
does not reflect the inordinate power of the premarital
agreement, which permits prospective spouses to regulate their

13 See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations are a
traditional area of state concern.”).
14 However, the notion of a premarital agreement has a long history in both England
and the United States. For a brief description of this history, see Sarah Ann Smith, The
Unique Agreements: Premarital and Marital Agreements, Their Impact Upon Estate
Planning, and Proposed Solutions to Problems Arising at Death, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 833,
840 (1992) and Judith T. Younger, Lovers’ Contracts in the Courts: Forsaking the
Minimum Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 349, 352–54 (2007).
15 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
16 Continental Europe and the United States significantly differ in their approaches
to premarital agreements, while England shares more similarities with the United States
on the subject. See infra Part II and note 107. But see supra note 8.
17 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1 (1983).
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rights and responsibilities not only during divorce or death,18 but
also during marriage.19
In the United States, spouses have significant freedom of
contract when it comes to premarital agreements. Spouses may
use the agreement to simply assign a piece of property, such as a
house, to one of the spouses. Spouses may also completely opt
out of the default property distribution regime of their state,20
which would otherwise govern their property distribution upon
divorce.
Specifically, each state has a default property distribution
regime of either: 1) equitable distribution, which means a fair but
not necessarily equal division between the spouses,21 or 2)
community property, which often results in a roughly equal
division of marital property between the spouses.22 Given their
18 “Since [the mid-nineteenth century] an arrangement in advance regarding each
spouse’s rights to the other’s estate at death has been an acceptable subject for a
premarital agreement.” Smith, supra note 14, at 840. Estate planning should therefore
carefully consider the property classifications created by a premarital agreement. See id.
at 855.
19 Describing different types of prenuptial agreements:
First, a prenuptial agreement may shield wealth acquired by one spouse before
marriage from the other. See, e.g., Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 594,
428 N.E.2d 810, 813 (1981); DeLorean v. DeLorean, 211 N.J. Super. 432, 435,
511 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Ch. Div. 1986). Second, a prenuptial agreement may
stipulate a division of property that is acquired during marriage. See, e.g.,
Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Gant v. Gant, 329
S.E.2d 106, 109 & n.1 (W. Va. 1985). Third, the contract may predetermine the
amount and timing of support one spouse will pay to the other after separation
or divorce. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 69 Haw. 497, 499, 748 P.2d 1362, 1364
(1988); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 387-88, 286 N.E.2d 42, 43-44 (1972).
Finally, some commentators have advocated the use of prenuptial agreements
to structure the terms of the ongoing relationship. See L. WEITZMAN, THE
MARRIAGE CONTRACT 225-54 (1981); Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage:
A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 219-23 (1982).
Recent Developments, Family Law—Prenuptial Agreements—Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Rejects Substantive Review of Prenuptial Agreements—Simeone v. Simeone, 581
A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990), 104 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1399 n.3 (1991).
20 See, e.g., Christine Davis, Note, ‘Til Debt Do Us Part: Premarital Contracting
Around Community Property Law—An Evaluation of Schlaefer v. Financial Management
Service, Inc., 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1051, 1055–57 (2000) (describing the effects on creditors of
a prospective spouse’s decision to opt out of a default community property regime through
a premarital agreement); Deborah H. Bell, Equitable Distribution: Implementing the
Marital Partnership Theory Through the Dual Classification System, 67 MISS. L.J. 115
(1997) (examining both default property distribution regimes in the United States).
21 For further discussion of the equitable distribution principle, see Ryznar, supra
note 8.
22 In the community property regime, marriage is treated as a partnership in which
property and debts acquired during the marriage belong to both spouses in equal,
undivided shares. WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1 (2d ed. 1971). The community property approach to the
distribution of property upon divorce is the default approach in only a minority of states,
which currently includes Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial
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contractual freedom, if prospective spouses reside in an equitable
distribution state, they may contract for a community property
division. If they reside in a community property state, they are
free to write a premarital agreement that would keep their
property separate.23 Prospective spouses may also enter into a
premarital agreement that changes the characterization of
particular property that would otherwise be characterized as
community under the state’s default regime.24
The characterization of property is especially important in
terms of determining which property one spouse’s creditors may
collect against.25 This is particularly true in community property
states.26 A debtor’s marriage in an equitable distribution state
has no impact on creditors, unless the debt is incurred to buy
household necessities.27 In a community property state, however,
creditors’ rights expand as a result of the debtor’s marriage: debt
may be collected from the spouse’s resources brought into the
marriage.28
Premarital agreements or, if entered into after wedlock,
matrimonial agreements may therefore impact how property is
Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 359, 370 (2005–
06). See also CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2550–56 (West 2004).
23 See, e.g., Elia v. Pifer, 977 P.2d. 796, 806 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (“We therefore
conclude that a valid premarital agreement abrogating community property rights
precludes a creditor of one spouse from proceeding against the separate property of the
other spouse on a claim arising during marriage.”);; Leasefirst v. Borrelli, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d
114, 116 (Cal. 1993) (holding that a “third-party creditor will not be entitled to recover
against former community assets transmuted into separate property” by a premarital
agreement (citing Olean Tile Co. v. Schultze, 169 Cal. App .3d 359, 365-65 (Cal. 1985)).
See also Smith, supra note 14, at 836.
24 Andrea B. Carroll, The Superior Position of the Creditor in the Community
Property Regime: Has the Community Become a Mere Creditor Collection Device?, 47
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 43 (2007).
25 Erik Paul Smith, Comment, The Uncertainty of Community Property for the
Tortious Liabilities of One of the Spouses: Where the Law Is Uncertain, There Is No Law,
30 IDAHO L. REV. 799 (1994).
26 For background on when and how creditors can reach community property to
satisfy the debts of one of the spouses in community property states, see id. See also
Smith, supra note 14 (analyzing the impact of premarital agreements under California
law).
27 “In many non-community property states, a nonearning spouse also may incur
debts for which the earning spouse is liable. Under the doctrine of necessaries, the
earning spouse is responsible for payment of expenses incurred by the nonearning spouse
for those things that are necessary for the family.” Susan Kalinka, Taxation of
Community Income: It Is Time for Congress to Override Poe v. Seaborn, 58 LA. L. REV. 73,
94 (1997). “Necessity” is determined by examining factors such as the spouses’ means,
social position, and circumstances. Id.
28 Carroll, supra note 24, at 29. See also Lisa R. Mahle, A Purse of Her Own: The
Case Against Joint Bank Accounts, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 45, 78–79 (2006) (“Since
creditors can potentially garnish all community property in a joint account, in community
property states when a creditor of one spouse wants to garnish a joint account, courts
must first determine whether the money in the account is community property, separate
property or joint tenancy property.”).
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held during the marriage and its effect on third persons, such as
creditors. This is particularly important in the nine community
property states, and, to give notice to creditors, sometimes these
agreements must be recorded in order to be binding on third
parties.29 Nonetheless, as the vast majority of states utilize
equitable distribution as a default—thereby blocking a creditors’
access to the property of the debtor’s spouse—the premarital
agreement in the United States typically has the most
significance upon divorce when the agreement governs its terms.
Premarital agreements may be drafted to either significantly
favor or disfavor the more vulnerable spouse upon divorce.30 For
example, a homemaker might include a provision that if his or
her spouse is unfaithful, and therefore caused the divorce, that
spouse must pay a significant portion of the assets.31 On the
other hand, a significantly lower-income spouse might contract to
keep his or her minimal financial marital contributions, leaving
the other spouse with the bulk of the assets. Premarital
agreements may also be drafted more neutrally toward both
parties, so that each maintains some significant assets.
It is important, however, to distinguish the premarital
agreement from the separation agreement, which permits
already married spouses to contract the terms of their divorce.
Cohabiting couples, meanwhile, may not enter into premarital
agreements, which become effective only upon marriage.32
Another important distinction is that between premarital
and postmarital agreements—a distinction that does not clearly
exist in the European countries.33 Postmarital, also known as
postnuptial, agreements are similar in substance and procedure
to premarital agreements, except that they are signed after
marriage. They are used to change provisions in the premarital
agreement, or if not already covered by a premarital agreement,
to make initial provisions, during the marriage, on the rights and
responsibilities of the parties upon divorce or death. Therefore,
the main difference between premarital and postmarital
agreements is their timing in relation to the marriage.
Carroll, supra note 24, at 32; see also infra Part III.B.
“Since premarital contracting could be utilized by women to overcome gendered
inequalities through marriage, summarily dismissing [premarital agreements] would
deny women the possibility of using private ordering for empowerment and
advancement.” Leah Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of Drafting
Premarital Agreements, 17 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 147, 152 (1996).
31 See, e.g., supra note 5 and accompanying text.
32 For a survey of the law on property distribution following an unsuccessful
cohabitation, see Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381
(2001).
33 See infra Part II.
29
30
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The premarital agreement is thus an important type of
contract with the power to govern a marriage and potential
divorce.34
The terms, meaning, and consequences of such
agreements in the United States have further been clarified
through judicial and legislative law.
B. A Brief History of the Premarital Agreement
Among the most important milestones in the evolution of the
American premarital agreement are Posner v. Posner,35 the first
notable judicial recognition of the enforcement of premarital
agreements, and the UPAA,36 an influential draft of statutory
law on the subject.
1. Case Law
Posner v. Posner is often cited as the first case upholding the
validity of premarital agreements, making Florida the first state
to recognize such agreements.37 In its opinion, the Posner court
noted the artificial distinction in other states’ case law that
skirted the issue of the validity of prenuptial agreements, but
permitted spouses to contract their own property settlements
under narrow circumstances.38 The court also took “judicial
notice of the fact that the ratio of marriages to divorces has
reached a disturbing rate in many states.”39 Therefore, the court
concluded that premarital agreements may be upheld under
certain conditions.
The Posner court also noted the differing viewpoints of the
appellate judges it overruled in the case, whose views
summarized the predominant stances on the premarital
agreement at the time. These views included that 1) the trial
court need not be bound by premarital agreements, though they
are permissible, 2) premarital agreements may be void on public
policy grounds, and 3) premarital agreements may be as binding
on the trial court as an agreement settling one spouse’s property
34 This power of the premarital agreements might be used to achieve fairer results
between the spouses following divorce. Currently, many women struggle to keep their
households running on a reduced income after a divorce. In 1993, the mean income for
divorced American mothers was $17,859, while for divorced fathers it was $31,034.
Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional Perspective, 34 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 6 (1995). But see generally Kelly Bedard & Olivier Deschênes,
Sex Preferences, Marital Dissolution, and the Economic Status of Women, 40 THE
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCES 411 (2005) (arguing that divorced women live in
households with more income per person than never-divorced women).
35 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970).
36 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (1983).
37 233 So. 2d at 384.
38 Id. at 383.
39 Id. at 384.
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rights upon the death of the other spouse.40 In overruling the
lower court, Posner marked the shift from the judicial practice of
voiding premarital agreements to a policy that recognized
premarital agreements as binding.
Although most states acknowledged the enforceability of
premarital agreements soon after Posner,41 state courts
continued to play a significant role in defining the appropriate
parameters of premarital contracts.42 For example, the Supreme
Court of Ohio outlined procedural safeguards in Gross v. Gross,43
while a Massachusetts court recently found that pregnancy does
not negate a bride’s free will to enter into a premarital
agreement.44 In Rhode Island, both parties need not have
counsel in order for a premarital agreement to be valid.45 In New
Jersey, the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be used to
validate an otherwise invalid agreement.46
However, states have become clearly divided on certain
issues, such as the formalities that must attend such
agreements47 and whether parties could contract on issues such
as spousal support.48 These interstate inconsistencies were most
problematic for mobile couples.49 The UPAA, considered next,
aimed to remedy some of these inconsistencies.

Id. at 382.
See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (finding that a less
deferential approach to the enforcement of premarital agreements would entail
“[p]aternalistic presumptions and protections [that sheltered] women from the
inferiorities and incapacities which they were perceived as having”).
42 See, e.g., Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So. 2d 1257, 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (deciding
that a premarital agreement signed the day before a wedding was voidable, but aggrieved
party may ratify it); Chubbuck v. Lake, 635 S.E.2d 764 (Ga. 2006) (finding that a
premarital agreement was void and unenforceable when it failed to meet the statutory
requirement that it be witnessed by two people); Seherr-Thoss v. Seherr-Thoss, 141 P.3d
705, 712 (Wyo. 2006) (determining that the laws governing the enforceability of contracts
also govern premarital agreements).
43 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (Ohio 1984). The Gross court stated that:
[Premarital] agreements are valid and enforceable . . . (1) if they have been
entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching; (2) if there
was full disclosure, or full knowledge and understanding of the nature, value
and extent of the prospective spouse’s property;; and (3) if the terms do not
promote or encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce.
Id.
44 Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687, 693 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
45 Marsocci v. Marsocci, 911 A.2d 690, 698 (R.I. 2006).
46 In re Estate of Shinn, 925 A.2d 88, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
47 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 2 cmt (1983).
48 Id.
49 Such movement often triggers conflict-of-law issues. The UPAA, which permits
prospective spouses to select “the choice of law governing the construction of the
agreement,” was specifically drafted to address “[t]he problems . . . exacerbated by the
mobility of our population.” UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT Prefatory Note, § 3 cmt
(1983). See also infra note 51.
40
41
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2. Statutory Law
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated the UPAA in 1983 to provide a uniform law on
premarital agreements. Approximately half of the states have
now adopted some variation of the UPAA.50
One of the most important characteristics of the UPAA is its
strong support of the freedom of contract. Section 3 of the Act
lists several topics a premarital agreement may cover, including
property rights, spousal support, and the choice of law governing
the agreement.51 Significantly, this list is not exhaustive and
parties may contract on any topic not in violation of either a
public policy principle or a criminal statute.52 The only topic
explicitly forbidden from premarital contracting is child support
that adversely affects the child, although as a general rule many
child-related provisions are typically considered to be against
public policy.53
Enforcement of premarital agreements is considered in
section 6 of the UPAA.54 This section provides that a premarital
agreement is unenforceable against a spouse who did not execute
the agreement voluntarily.55 The premarital agreement is also
unenforceable if it was unconscionable when executed and the
spouse: (1) was not provided fair disclosure of the other spouse’s
financial details; (2) did not waive the right to receive such
disclosure; and, (3) did not have adequate knowledge of those
financial details.56 Therefore, a person with knowledge of a
spouse’s financial status or reason to know of it, coupled with
voluntary execution, cannot contest the premarital agreement.57

50 Charles W. Willey, Effect in Montana of Community-Source Property Acquired in
Another State (And Its Impact on a Montana Marriage Dissolution, Estate Planning,
Property Transfers, and Probate), 69 MONT. L. REV. 313, 365 (2008). For examples of
various states’ UPAA-based laws, see CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (West 2004); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 10/1 et seq. (West 1993); and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-17-6 (2003).
51 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (1983). See also Montoya v. Montoya, 909
A.2d 947 (Conn. 2006); Bradley v. Bradley, 164 P.3d 537 (Wyo. 2007). For an excellent
discussion of choice of law issues in premarital agreements, see Julia Halloran
McLaughlin, Premarital Agreements and Choice of Law: “One, Two, Three, Baby, You and
Me,” 72 MO. L. REV. 793 (2007).
52 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 cmt (1983).
53 Id.
54 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (1983). For constructive criticism of the
UPAA’s enforcement provision, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering
Concerns About the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127 (1993).
Meanwhile, section 7 of the UPAA governs enforceability of agreements in marriages that
were subsequently determined to be void. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 7
(1983).
55 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT at § 6.
56 Id.
57 Id. at § 6 cmt.
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Similarly, a person who waived knowledge of these financial
details and voluntarily executed the agreement is bound by it.58
Although the UPAA is a source of some guidance, the law on
premarital agreements remains in the realm of the states and
any generalization is therefore difficult. Nonetheless, it is a fair
observation that American states typically provide prospective
spouses significant contractual freedom and premarital
agreements are enforceable unless they fail judicial review.59
C. Theoretical Underpinnings
The modern premarital agreement is rooted in contract law
theories.60
Parties to a premarital agreement, viewed as
independent negotiators,61 have almost full discretion over the
contents and scope of their agreement, enabling them to dictate
the terms of their divorce absent any enforceability issues.62 This
is particularly important for community property states such as
California, where parties may waive their rights to share
property.63
Many commentators have noted that marriage itself has
evolved from a relationship based on status to one regulated by
contract.64 This shift from marriage as regulated by the state to
marriage as determined by the private ordering between parties
has been called “the privatization of family law.”65
58 Id.
There is an additional provision that bars enforcement of a premarital
agreement to the extent that it would force the lower income spouse onto welfare. Id. at
§ 6(b).
59 See infra Part I.D.1.
60 “[A] premarital agreement is a contract. As required for any other contract, the
parties must have the capacity to contract in order to enter into a binding agreement.”
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 2 cmt (1983). The UPAA also draws upon contract
and commercial law for the standard of unconscionability. Id. at § 6 cmt.
61 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of Marriage, in THE
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 201 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) [hereinafter FALL
AND RISE OF CONTRACT].
62 See infra Part I.D.1.
63 See supra Part I.A.
64 Scott & Scott, supra note 61, at 201. Marriage as status means, in essence, that
family law automatically bestows a set of rights and obligations upon people who are
marrying, which can be altered only by divorce, not by mutual agreement. For an
excellent discussion of the interplay between marriage as status and marriage as
contract, see Lisa Milot, Note, Restitching the American Marital Quilt: Untangling
Marriage from the Nuclear Family, 87 VA. L. REV. 701 (2001); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce
and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts
and Dissociation under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993). For a description of
freedom of contract in covenant marriage, which is a more binding form of marriage
available in a few states, see Margaret F. Brinig, Contracting Around No-Fault Divorce,
in FALL AND RISE OF CONTRACT, supra note 61, at 275.
65 Scott & Scott, supra note 61, at 203. It is important to note here, however, that
there is a major distinction between (1) marital behavior being governed by contract and
(2) divorce being governed by contract. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Marriage: The Status
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However, there are obvious distinctions between contracts
and premarital agreements, casting doubt on whether contract
law provides an appropriate framework for premarital
agreements.66 Most problematically, the bargaining process in
the marital context is not at arm’s length, but “may be afflicted
by unreflective love, even infatuation.”67
Additionally, the
characteristics of marriage, so dependent on life circumstances
and children, are sufficiently unique to prevent the blind
application of pure contract principles.68
Nonetheless, premarital agreements are often defended on
partnership principles as well.69 There are inconsistencies,
however, in the notion that premarital agreements inherently
advance the prospective spouses’ equality. Specifically, a court’s
ability to invalidate a premarital agreement suggests that one of
the partners is too weak to contract.70 Conversely, if a court
upholds skewed premarital agreements, then spouses may
bargain for unequal treatment. It has been suggested that
premarital agreements must move in the direction of dividing
property equally, or else they are at odds with the view of
marriage as a partnership.71 This proposition, however, would
defeat the entire purpose of a premarital agreement, which is to
provide parties a method of contracting around defaults.
Therefore, it is not entirely clear whether premarital agreements
enhance or undermine the idea of marriage as an equal
partnership. They may certainly be used by parties to effectively
do either, depending on the terms of the agreement.

of Contract, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1039 (1983) (reviewing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE
MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1981)).
66 Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in FALL AND RISE OF CONTRACT,
supra note 61, at 256.
67 Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriage as a Signal, in FALL AND RISE OF CONTRACT,
supra note 61, at 254. For the argument that premarital contracting creates greater
equality of bargaining power than either intramarital or postmarital bargaining, see
generally id.
68 Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1996, 2096–97 (2003).
69 See, e.g., UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 cmt (1983), which prioritizes
protecting spouses “against overreaching, concealment of assets, and sharp dealing not
consistent with the obligations of marital partners to deal fairly with each other.”
(emphasis added).
70 This recalls the days when women could not legally contract. See, e.g., Poole v.
Perkins, 101 S.E. 240 (Va. 1919).
71 Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, supra note 68, at
2096:
[D]eference to freedom of contract in antenuptial agreement law is
undesirable. . . . [A]cknowledgment of the partnership conception of marriage
demands that parties desiring to execute antenuptial agreements approximate
the fifty-fifty division of property implicit in the partnership approach or stand
prepared to prove the agreements’ substantive fairness at the time of divorce.
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Although both the partnership and contractual frameworks
have flaws when applied to the marital context, they have
underpinned and legitimized premarital agreements. As a
result, couples have benefited from the opportunity to
contractually circumvent judicial and statutory defaults in the
case of divorce.
D. Enforceability
Section six of the UPAA,72 or the corresponding state statute,
governs the enforceability of premarital agreements. However, it
is the courts that are the ultimate arbiters of whether a
particular premarital agreement governs the terms of divorce.73
The issue of enforceability arises most frequently following a
court’s procedural and substantive review of a premarital
agreement.74
1. Judicial Review
In order to be upheld by the court, a premarital agreement
must survive substantive and procedural review.75 Occasionally,
these separate inquiries are blurred.76 In other words, if the
substance of the agreement appears fair to the court, defects in
the bargaining process may be of lesser importance. However, if
the agreement seems particularly unfair to one spouse, courts
may examine the procedures surrounding its execution more
closely.77
In terms of substantive review,78 some courts have departed
from the standard unconscionability doctrine by which

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (1983). See supra Part I.B.2.
See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(c) (1983) (“An issue of
unconscionability of a premarital agreement shall be decided by the court as a matter of
law.”).
74 Some commentators have warned that enforcement of premarital agreements
must be done carefully so as to not disadvantage women. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 54,
at 129.
75 For the argument that courts rarely invalidate premarital agreements following
procedural and substantive review, see Younger, supra note 14, at 358–59, 422–23. One
commentator suggests that the procedural and substantive fairness protections placed on
premarital agreements reflect each state’s view of the appropriate balance between
individual autonomy and state oversight of premarital agreements. McLaughlin, supra
note 51, at 853.
76 Younger, supra note 14, at 356–57.
77 Id.
78 See Karen Servidea, Note, Reviewing Premarital Agreements to Protect the State’s
Interests in Marriage, 91 VA. L. REV. 535, 540–41 (2005). Some critics argue that a
substantive review of premarital agreements is paternalistic. See Simeone v. Simeone,
581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
72
73
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commercial contracts are evaluated.79 Instead, judges often
examine the fairness of the premarital agreement at the time of
divorce.80 Furthermore, certain topics fall outside the scope of
permissible contracting for public policy reasons,81 including a
child’s religion,82 child custody, child care payments, or parental
visitation.
Meanwhile, the test for procedural fairness focuses on the
parties’ conduct in obtaining the premarital agreement.83 First,
each party must have voluntarily entered into the agreement,
absent fraud, overreaching, sharp dealing,84 or duress.85
Additionally, at the time the parties entered into the agreement,
disclosure of each party’s financial status is required.86
Significant departure from these accepted procedural practices
provides courts with the opportunity to circumvent premarital
agreements in resolving the issues arising during divorce
proceedings.

79 But see supra notes 60 and 73; Lane v. Lane, 202 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. 2006) (finding
that although public policy does not render antenuptial agreements per se invalid, such
agreements may be analyzed by courts as unconscionable).
80 Servidea, supra note 78, at 540–41.
81 I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115,
1169 (2008). See also Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in FALL AND RISE OF
CONTRACT, supra note 61, at 256 (“Aside from the restrictions on termination provisions
in prenuptial agreements, potential mates cannot bind themselves legally to marriages in
which spouses’ domestic, financial, and sharing obligations are specified by contract.
Polygamous and same-sex marriages are prohibited. These laws are not default rules, but
restrictions on freedom of marital contract.”). For the argument that courts should lift
restrictions on marital contracting to obtain less paternalistic and more efficient results,
see Milot, supra note 64. Other scholars have similarly argued for even greater
contractual freedom. See, e.g., Joan M. Krauskopf & Rhonda C. Thomas, Partnership
Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J.
558 (1974); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for
State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204 (1982). But see Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards
and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1399 (1984) (arguing that absolute freedom of contract may hinder fair results upon
divorce).
82 See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). See also Alexandra
Selfridge, Challenges for Negotiating and Drafting an Antenuptial Agreement for the
Religious Upbringing of Future Children, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 91 (2007).
83 Younger, supra note 14, at 357.
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348 (N.H. 2003).
86 See, e.g., Blige v. Blige, 656 S.E.2d 822 (Ga. 2008) (holding that both parties
entering into an antenuptial agreement must provide a full and fair disclosure of all
material facts); Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533 (Conn. 2007) (determining that disclosure
requirements for a premarital agreement are satisfied when the parties disclose a general
approximation of their income, assets, and liabilities).
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2. Formulaic Premarital Agreements
The question of enforceability plagues not only procedurally
and substantively complicated agreements,87 but also simple
ones.
Any internet search reveals premarital agreement
packages with boilerplate language, allowing the prospective
spouses to sign formulaic contracts without spending money on
attorneys’ fees.88
Ultimately, form premarital agreements are not inherently
more or less enforceable than those drafted by lawyers.89 They
are subject to the same procedural and substantive limitations as
any other premarital agreement, thus representing a reliable
option for low cost divorce planning.
There are certainly advantages and disadvantages to an
increased use of such unsophisticated premarital agreements.
On the one hand, without lawyers, prospective spouses may not
know the depth and scope of potential negotiations, lessening
their bargaining power.
On the other hand, inexpensive
premarital agreements allow spouses of modest means to plan for
a potential divorce.90 Furthermore, because one side does not
outmatch the other in legal power, perhaps the spouses achieve
greater equality in such negotiations.
In many ways, the formulaic premarital agreement parallels
the holographic will. Similar public policy reasons permit both,
centering on the autonomy of the individual to dispose of his or
her own property. Furthermore, the do-it-yourself premarital

87 For a good review of the complex financial issues that might be considered by a
premarital agreement, see David M. Johnson, Complex Financial Issues in Family Law
Cases, 37 COLO. LAW. 53 (2008).
88 For examples of companies that sell asset protection in marriage, see
http://prenuptialagreementform.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2009) (form premarital
agreements for as low as $29.99) and http://www.legalformsbank.biz/premarital.asp (last
visited Oct. 11, 2009) (same for $9.95). See also Andrew Blair-Stanek, Comment, Defaults
and Choices in the Marriage Contract: How to Increase Autonomy, Encourage Discussion,
and Circumvent Constitutional Constraints, 24 TOURO L. REV. 31, 68 n.166 (2008).
89 See, e.g., UNI. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 6 cmt. (1983):
Nothing in Section 6 [regarding enforcement] makes the absence of assistance
of independent legal counsel a condition for the unenforceability of a
premarital agreement. However, lack of that assistance may well be a factor in
determining whether the conditions stated in Section 6 may have existed (see,
e.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962)).
This UPAA provision would most likely be applicable to cases where only one of the
parties was assisted by independent legal counsel.
90 Somewhat counter-intuitively, those of modest means may need premarital
agreements the most because marriages are particularly vulnerable to dissolution when
spouses encounter financial trouble. See, e.g., HENRY J. SOMMER ET. AL., COLLIER FAMILY
LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, ¶6.05[5], at xiii (2009) (“In some parts of the country as
many as half of all marriages end in divorce, often due, at least in part, to financial
difficulties.”).
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agreement symbolizes the preference of the American philosophy
for nearly complete freedom of contracting, permitting
prospective spouses to enter into an agreement uninfluenced by
judicial or legislative preferences.91
This cornerstone of
American philosophy, so favorable to freedom of contract, in fact
drives many of the distinctions between American and European
law on the subject of premarital agreements.
In sum, Americans may utilize the premarital agreement to
avoid judicial and statutory defaults in their states, enjoying
significant freedom of contract. The force of the premarital
agreement has been effectively developed over the past several
decades, resulting in an important role for premarital
agreements in many American couples’ engagements.
Interestingly, however, premarital agreements have a longer
history in many European countries, acquiring significantly
different consequences and meaning.
II. EUROPEAN LAW ON MARITAL AGREEMENTS AS EXEMPLIFIED BY
POLAND
Europe generally does not share the distinction that exists in
the United States between premarital and postmarital
agreements. Instead, both types of agreements are treated as
one type of contract: the marital agreement. The marital
agreement may be concluded either before the marriage
ceremony or during the marriage.92
This Part analyzes the approaches to marital agreements in
Europe, focusing on France, Germany, Poland, and
Switzerland.93 The Polish approach is given more in-depth
treatment, not only because it is representative of the others, but
also because it illustrates notable differences from the American
approach.
These European legal systems have several commonalities
that are worth mentioning at the outset. Under the French Civil
Code,94 the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (“BGB”),95 the

But see sources cited supra notes 67 and 73.
But see C. CIV. 1394–97 (France).
“Comparisons among [England, France, Germany, and the United States]
continue to seem fruitful, not only because of the great influence their legal systems exert
in the civil and common law worlds, but also because each has generated a rich
assortment of legal and social science materials.”
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND
WESTERN EUROPE 3 (1989).
94 C. CIV. (France).
95 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt
[RGBI] 195, as amended, §§ 1426, 1432, 1437, 1519, 1549.
91
92
93

Do Not Delete

2009]

2/2/2010 8:15 PM

Premarital Agreements in the Comparative Context

43

Swiss Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch (“ZGB”),96 and the Polish
Kodeks Rodzinny i Opiekuńczy (“KRO”),97 there are a few
optional systems of matrimonial property law aside from the
statutory regime governing the marriage. As a general rule,
spouses may modify the standard statutory regime that would
apply to their matrimonial relations by means of a marital
agreement.98 Importantly, spouses are not obliged to choose any
specific contractual system and can avoid at least some of the
consequences of the standard statutory regime.99 Nonetheless,
spouses do not have entirely unrestricted autonomy with regard
to their matrimonial property law in any of the countries
considered, nor is entering into a marital agreement popular.100
A. Various European Countries’ Approaches
It should be mentioned that prospective spouses in many
European countries resist marital agreements altogether because
they think that such documents are only important upon divorce.
Therefore, spouses often do not enter into such agreements
because they want to underscore that they are not going to
divorce.101 Such an opinion of marital agreements derives from
American movies and news regarding the divorces of celebrities.
Very rarely, however, is the situation of these divorcing
celebrities analyzed within a larger context and within the legal
circumstances that are specific to the United States. This is
understandable because the main aim of movies is not to teach.
Nonetheless, the result is that the opinion of marital
agreements in Europe is built upon the false conviction that
marital agreements in Europe have the same consequences as
those in the United States, when in reality the meaning and
consequences of such agreements in Europe differ from those in
the United States. In Europe, the regime choice made by the
spouses in a marital agreement mainly impacts how property is
held during the marriage and which property is available to the
creditors of one spouse.102 While the rules of distribution of
property upon divorce are also determined by the chosen regime,
96 Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB] [Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, RS 210,
art. 177–247 (Switz.).
97 Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy – The Family and Guardianship Code of 25th
February 1964 - Dz. U. nr 9, poz. 59 with amendments [hereinafter “KRO”].
98 See infra Parts II.A. & II.B. for further discussion.
99 Id.
100 In France, for example, only 10% of spouses decide to enter into a marital
agreement, and they do so mostly when important assets or second marriages are
involved. See CAROLYN HAMILTON & ALISON PERRY, FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 261 (2d ed.
2002).
101 This might also be a signaling problem. See supra note 2.
102 See, e.g., infra Part II.A.1.
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spouses may modify them only in a very narrow way through the
marital agreement.103
Therefore, among the most important points to initially
consider is that the marital agreement has a different meaning
in Europe than in the United States, and differing meanings
within Europe as well.104 In certain European countries, all of
the contracts between spouses are called marital agreements.
The permissible scope of the marital agreement also differs from
European country to country. In some countries, a marital
agreement concerns only the relations between spouses, while in
others, the agreement may regulate the consequences of a
spouse’s death.105 Furthermore, in some countries, there are only
a few models of property regimes from which spouses may
choose. In other countries, spouses are not obliged to follow the
statutory models of the regimes and have more freedom with
regard to the content of their marital agreements.106
Nonetheless, two fundamental approaches to marital
agreements can be distinguished in Europe.107 According to the
first approach, the marital agreement is a kind of general
agreement, constructing the rules of the classification of property
and the relations of the spouses, but on the other hand, not
regarding any particular property.108 The second approach is
based on the rule that each contract between spouses is a marital
agreement, even if it concerns only certain chattels belonging to
one spouse.109
1. France
The meaning of the term “marital agreement” is quite broad
in France. It covers not only the agreements in which spouses
choose their matrimonial regime, but also the contracts
See, e.g., infra Part II.A.3.
This is a very important point given the current process of European unification
and harmonization in the field of family law. See, e.g., Esin Örücü, A Family Law for
Europe: Necessary, Feasible, Desirable?, in PERSPECTIVES FOR THE UNIFICATION AND
HARMONISATION OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 551 (Katharina Boele-Woelki ed., Intersentia
2003) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES].
105 See
Allgemeines
bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch
[ABGB]
[Civil
Code]
Justizgesetzsammlung [JGS] No. 946/1816, as amended § 1217 (Austria).
106 Austria and France serve as examples of such countries. See HAMILTON & PERRY,
supra note 100, at 12, 260–61.
107 These remarks concern only continental Europe because the English approach to
marital agreements is similar to the American one. See, e.g., Nigel Lowe & Roger Kay,
The Status of Prenuptial Agreements in English Law – Eccentricity or Sensible
Pragmatism?, in FAMILY FINANCES 395–413 (Bea Verschraegen ed., 2009) [hereinafter
FAMILY FINANCES]. But see supra note 8 (noting the lack of enforceability of premarital
agreements in England).
108 See Lowe & Kay, supra note 107, at 395–413.
109 Id.
103
104
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regarding every chattel belonging to at least one spouse.110
Spouses are free to regulate the rules concerning the
management of their property and are entitled, by any kind of
agreement, to modify the default statutory community property
regime.111
There are a few models of property regimes known by the
Civil Code in France: separation of property,112 separation in
acquisition,113 universal community,114 and community of
movables and acquisitions.115 Spouses may choose among these
in their marital agreements, but are prohibited from electing
former types of marital regimes, such as, for example, the dotal
system.116
If the spouses were married without any provision
concerning matrimonial property law, the default statutory
system of a limited community property is applied.117 In this
system, only property acquired during the marriage is held in
common, although gifts and inheritances acquired during the
marriage are the separate property of each spouse.118
Community property belongs to both spouses jointly, although
each spouse is able to make ordinary acts of administration of
community property. However, important transactions relating
to this kind of property need the consent of both spouses.119
Importantly, when the record of marriage mentions that a
marital agreement has not been made, third parties may assume
110

(1995).

WALTER CAIRNS & ROBERT MCKEON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 69–70

See C. CIV. 1497 (France).
See CAIRNS & MCKEON, supra note 110, at 71. In this regime, spouses hold
property separately. Id.
113 In this regime, spouses behave as if they were married under the regime of
separation of property. At the dissolution of the regime, each spouse receives half of the
value of the net acquisitions belonging to the property of the other spouse. Id.
114 In this regime, “the community includes not only the acquets and gains of the
marriage, but also any property brought into the marriage by either spouse.” Carroll,
supra note 24, at 27. However, property that is separate by its nature—property
delineated as such in C. CIV. 1404 (France)—does not fall into community property,
unless otherwise stipulated.
115 This system is similar to the limited community property system.
The key
characteristic of this system is that immovables are not part of the common property of
spouses.
116 The dotal system was in force during medieval times and in some areas later. It
was also recognized by Roman law. In this system, the wife was typically given with a
dower, which was administrated by her husband during the marriage and was given back
to her upon the death of her husband. Being a former property regime, however, it is not
currently mentioned by the Civil Code and therefore may not be chosen by spouses today.
See CAIRNS & MCKEON, supra note 110, at 71.
117 Some authors translate the name of this regime as the “community of ownership
of matrimonial property.” See HAMILTON & PERRY, supra note 100, at 260.
118 C. CIV. 1402 (France).
119 C. CIV. 1421 (France).
111
112
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that spouses have been married under the default statutory
regime of limited community property.120 However, this rule is
not applied if the spouses have declared, in the transaction
entered into with a third party, that they had made a marital
agreement.121
The freedom of contract in the field of marital agreements is
very well-developed in French law, especially when compared to
the other European countries. 122 In their marital agreements,
spouses in France may choose one of the property regimes
mentioned by the Civil Code, but may also modify the rules of
these regimes: spouses may mix different regimes and are even
able to establish new regimes that are not recognized by the
law.123 Unlike the other European countries examined here,
spouses in France are also able to make provisions for what
should happen upon their death.124 Spouses may also opt for
universal community, which is not popular in Europe.125
However, there are some limitations on this freedom of
contract. For example, the marital agreement cannot be against
public order (public morals).126 Furthermore, spouses are not
able to modify the rules of the so-called primary regime (régime
primaire)127 and the statutory order of successions.128 Finally,
spouses are not permitted to derogate from the rules regarding
parental authority or guardianship,129 nor may they derogate
from the duties and rights which result from marriage.130
In France, marital agreements should be concluded before
wedlock.
During the marriage, the marital agreement is
immutable (principe d’immutabilité).131 However there is an

120 The record of marriage is a certificate given to the spouses and serves as proof
that they are married.
121 C. CIV. 1394 (France).
122 CAIRNS & MCKEON, supra note 110, at 52, 69.
123 See HAMILTON & PERRY, supra note 100, at 260–61.
124 This kind of provision may not necessarily be implicated in every case, as, for
example, when certain property cannot be disposed of freely. Id. at 261.
125 In this regime, “the community includes not only the acquets and gains of the
marriage, but also any property brought into the marriage by either spouse.” Carroll,
supra note 24, at 27. This prohibition in other countries is explained by the nature of
some rights, the subject of which can only be one person.
126 See C. CIV. 1387 (France).
127 This is a catalogue of rules regarding the rights and duties of spouses from which
no derogation may be made. This compulsory regime is laid down by the Civil Code. Its
provisions regard, for example, the financial contribution of spouses to household
expenses, to the upbringing of children, as well as to the family home.
128 C. CIV. 1389 (France).
129 C. CIV. 1388 (France).
130 Id.
131 C. Civ. 1396 (France).
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exception to this rule:132 spouses may change their financial
relations after two years of having a particular regime.133 In any
case, the marital agreement should be agreed upon before a
notary and approved by the court.134 The marital agreement is
enforceable after the decision of the court and has effect on third
persons135 three months after mention of it has been entered into
the margin of both copies of the record of marriage.136 Spouses
should make a suitable motion to enter information about their
marital regime into the record of marriage.
The marital agreement should be concluded by prospective
spouses, or by spouses during the marriage, even if one of them
has not gained full legal capacity. A minor who obtained consent
for contracting into the marriage or an adult in guardianship or
curatorship may enter into marital agreements, but must then be
assisted by the person who is authorized to give consent for the
marriage.137 The spouses may also give power of attorney to an
agent who will conclude the marital agreement acting on his or
her behalf.138
It is very important that the parties be simultaneously
present and that the marital agreement be made with the
consent of both spouses or their agents.139 As previously
mentioned, the marital agreement needs to be in the form of a
notarized deed. The notary public delivers to the spouses a
certificate which confirms that the agreement has been

See C. CIV. 1397 (France).
It must be demanded that the change of a matrimonial regime be made “in the
interest of the family.” Id.
134 The court referenced here is the court of the spouses’ domicile. Id.
135 This means that spouses are able to rely on the provisions of the marital
agreement in limiting their ownership in certain property, particularly when it comes to
the creditors of one spouse. These provisions therefore actually determine the scope of
property available to creditors. This issue is particularly important in countries where
the community of property is the default statutory regime. In this regime, the creditor of
one spouse typically has recourse against the community property. But if the spouses
limited the community property through a marital agreement, the rights of the creditor
would be restricted. On the other hand, if a creditor has recourse only against the
separate property of the spouse who is the debtor, and the spouses extend the community
property, the creditor’s position is weaker. In this case, the creditor has recourse only
against the separate property, such as when, for example, the debt regards the separate
property of the spouse or the contract was concluded without the consent of the other
spouse.
136 See C. CIV. 1397 (France).
137 See C. CIV. 148 (France).
138 Katharina Boele-Woelki, Matrimonial Property Law from a Comparative Law
Perspective, in C111 SERIES ARS NOTARIATUS 7 (Hans Warendorf trans., 2000) available
at http://www.reading.ac.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?lID=7018&sID=34870
[hereinafter “Boele-Woelki, Matrimonial Property Law”].
139 C. CIV. 1394 (France).
132
133
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completed. This certificate must be lodged with the officer of civil
status before the celebration of the marriage.140
Finally, in their marital agreements, spouses may make
provisions for a spouse’s death. Specifically, they may decide
that the surviving spouse be authorized to receive from the
common property “either a specified sum, or a specified property
in kind, or a specified quantity of a determined kind of
property.”141 Such a provision does not affect the rights of the
surviving spouse under inheritance law.142 Expenses arising
during the marriage may also be allotted to each spouse by a
marital agreement.143
2. Germany
According to German law, spouses enter into a marital
agreement
(Ehevertrag)
to
regulate
their
financial
relationships.144 This definition of marital agreement is quite
broad and therefore the source of some doubts. For example, it is
not clear whether contracts made between spouses in order to
transfer ownership of a certain part of their property should be
treated as marital agreements.
The marital agreement can introduce a marital regime or
change the rules of the regime chosen by the spouses. This
means that the marital agreement is a special kind of tool used to
decide the financial consequences of marriage and the financial
relations between spouses.145 Through it, spouses may choose
from the contractual property regimes in Germany, which
include separation of property146 and community of property.147

C. CIV. 1395 (France).
C. CIV. 1515 (France).
C. CIV. 1516 (France).
According to article 214 of the French Civil Code, when spouses do not regulate
this matter, they shall contribute to the marriage expenses in proportion to their
respective means. See C. CIV. 214 (France).
144 Only spouses can be parties to these agreements. If other people are parties to the
agreement, it does not qualify as a marital agreement. See GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM &
LAWS 467 (Nigel G. Foster & Satish Sule eds., 3d ed. 2002).
145 See INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 257–58 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll
eds., 2d ed. 2005). It should be emphasized that different contracts between spouses such
as, for example, donation or loan contracts are not marital agreements and are governed
by the general rules of BGB (German Civil Code), instead of by the provisions regarding
marital agreements. INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 193 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W.
Finkin eds., 1996).
146 Separation of property is a regime in which spouses hold their property
separately. See Foster & Sule, supra note 144, at 468.
147 See BGB §§ 1414–1415. Community of property is a regime in which there are
three groups of assets: community property, the property of the wife, and the property of
the husband. See Foster & Sule, supra note 144, at 468. This Part of the Article uses the
term “community of property” to describe this specific property regime and the term
140
141
142
143
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If the spouses have not concluded a marital agreement, they
remain in the default statutory regime, which is community of
surplus (Zugewinngemeinschaft).148 This name is misleading,
however, because it is actually a regime based on separation of
property during the marriage, with the surplus divided at the
end of the marriage.149 If the spouses decide not to contract
around this default statutory regime, they are free to make some
changes to this regime.150 For example, spouses may eliminate
some of the restrictions regarding the transfer of certain assets
or change the rules concerning the equalization of accruals that
determine the division of the surplus.151
Meanwhile, if the spouses contract into the community
property regime, they are able to establish the rules on the
composition of each spouse’s separate capital and community
property.152 They may also change the rules of management of
the community property, as well as the rules regarding the
division of common property.153
Generally, there is some freedom of contract in marital
agreements in Germany, but spouses must choose one of the
regimes stated in the Civil Code.154 It is also possible to modify
some of the statutory rules, but only within certain limits
established by law. Spouses are not allowed to introduce any
foreign law’s regime that is not recognized by German law.155 It
is also forbidden to mix different regimes.156 Such limited
freedom of contracting in marital agreements is justified by the
desire for certainty of business and the guarantee of formality.
In Germany, the marital agreement can be concluded by
spouses or prospective spouses. If a spouse does not have full
legal capacity, German law is more restrictive than French law.
A prospective spouse with limited legal capacity must be assisted
by his or her legal representative and, in certain circumstances,

“community property” to describe the property that belongs to both spouses in this
regime.
148 Foster & Sule, supra note 144, at 468.
149 See Reimann & Zekoll, supra note 145, at 257. When analyzing this regime and
its rules, one can come to the conclusion that it should actually be called the sharing of
accruals or the community of increase. See GERHARD ROBBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
GERMAN LAW 283 (4th ed. 2006).
150 GERHARD ROBBERS, supra note 149, at 283.
151 Id.
152 BGB § 1474.
153 See id.
154 See, e.g., Reimann & Zekoll, supra note 145, at 257–58.
155 See 2008 Martindale-Hubbell Law Digest – European Law Digests 1 GERMANY:
LAW DIGEST OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 13.03.
156 See BGB § 1409.
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must have the approval of the court (Vormundschaftsgericht).157
Still, both parties to the agreement must be present in front of
the notary public.158 As in French law, the marital agreement
should be made before a notary, but the approval of a court is not
necessary if the agreement needs to be changed.159
The marital agreement should be registered in a special
register, kept by a court (Amtsgericht) and called the register of
marital regimes (Güterrechtsregister).160 The registration makes
the marital agreement enforceable against third persons from the
day of its registration.161 This duty of registration ensures that
third persons know the financial situation of the parties,
including the property arrangements made in the marital
agreement between the spouses that would impact the scope of
property available to the creditors of one of the spouses. The
motion to register the marital agreement may be made by either
spouse.
Due to this registration, third persons are protected. They
may rely on the fact that the spouses are in the regime
mentioned in the register. If they are not mentioned because
they have changed the regime but their marital agreement has
not been published in the register, third parties are not
affected.162 Finally, the register is public and each person who is
interested may access it without providing a reason.163
3. Switzerland
Another example of European regulation of marital
agreements is found in Swiss law, which treats the marital
agreement as a special kind of contract concluded by spouses or
prospective spouses in order to choose or modify their marital
regime.164 In such agreements, spouses are free to introduce
general rules regarding the classification of their property and to
modify the rules of their marital regime.165 Spouses are also able
to choose their marital regime or change it within the limits
introduced by law.166
BGB § 1411.
BGB § 1318.
BGB § 1410.
BGB § 1558.
See ROBBERS, supra note 149, at 283.
It does, however, take effect between spouses.
163 See BGB § 1558.
164 See Barbara E. Graham-Siegenthaler, Principles of Marriage Recognition Applied
to Same-Sex Marriage Recognition in Switzerland and Europe, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 121,
123 (1998).
165 See Jacques-Michel Grossen & Olivier Guillod, Family Law, in INTRODUCTION TO
SWISS LAW, 59, 64 (F. Dessemontet & T. Ansay eds., 3d ed. 2004).
166 HAMILTON & PERRY, supra note 100, at 670.
157
158
159
160
161
162
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The default statutory regime is the deferred community of
acquisitions (Errungenschaftsbeteiligung).167 In this regime,
each spouse has his or her separate property during the marriage
and upon divorce there is a distribution of goods.168 Spouses who
decide to remain in this standard statutory regime are free to
change the rules of the classification of property.169 Importantly,
if they are entrepreneurs, spouses may choose which property
will receive income from their commercial activities.170 They may
also change each other’s share in acquisitions.171
Spouses may also contract around this default and choose a
separate property regime or one of a few types of community
property.172 If community of property is the regime chosen by the
spouses, they may decide that their community property will
consist only of accruals.173 They may also establish the rules
concerning shares in common property.174 However, there is a
catalog of marital agreements introduced by law and it is
forbidden to create regimes containing only certain elements of
these different regimes.175
The marital agreement (Ehevertrag) may be concluded by
spouses during a marriage or by prospective spouses (Brautleute)
before wedlock.176
In order to conclude a valid marital
agreement, spouses must possess legal capacity and the contract
must be publicly authenticated.177 Importantly, the marital
agreement may be changed at any time during marriage.178
Contrary to German law, the ZGB does not contain any
requirements to publish the marital agreement in a register,
however, a marital agreement can be mentioned in a commercial
register.179
B. The Polish Approach
The main subject of the European Part of this Article is
Poland’s approach to marital agreements.
Polish law is
interesting for two reasons. First, the Polish approach is
different from the American one in many respects. Second,
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See ZGB art. 216–217.
HAMILTON & PERRY, supra note 100, at 670.
Id.
Id. at 673.
Id.
ZGB art. 179.
See ZGB art. 180–181.
HAMILTON & PERRY, supra note 100, at 673.
See generally ZGB.
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Poland’s present regulation of marital agreements is quite new
and was influenced by the above mentioned regulations, which
have longer traditions and are well-established.180 Nonetheless,
the concept of the marital agreement has a long history in
Poland, especially when compared with the American history of
premarital agreements. Even in communist times, Polish law
guaranteed spouses the possibility of contractually opting out of
the standard statutory regime.181
Marital agreements in Poland are special treaties for
spouses.182 According to Polish law, the marital agreement
(umowa majątkowa małżeńska, intercyza) is a contract concluded
by spouses or prospective spouses in which their property is
regulated in a different way than from the default statutory
regime.183 The marital agreement also organizes the property of
the spouses and dictates the ownership of each spouse as a rule
in the future.184 The essence of marital agreements is that they
classify property after the agreement comes into force. However,
it is also possible to conclude an agreement in which spouses
introduce separation of property and divide their common
property.185 In such a case, it is unclear whether this agreement
should be treated as a marital agreement because it concerns the
previous property as opposed to property which may be
purchased in the future.186
In Poland, freedom of contract in regards to marital
agreements is limited. Such limitations are justified by the aim
for certainty of transactions, equity for spouses, and protection of
family interests.187 Spouses are free to introduce regimes named
in KRO article 47 § 1,188 but their freedom is confined to the
systems provided by law.189 When the circumstances causing the
mandatory regime have ceased, spouses who were in the
mandatory regime may decide to reinstate the previous regime or
180 It is worth noting that from 1918, when Poland regained its independence, to the
end of 1946, German law was in force in west and north Poland and the source of civil law
in the central part of Poland was the Napoleonic Code, which was replaced by the civil
code of the Kingdom of Poland based on the Napoleonic Code. From 1836 to 1918, the
matrimonial law in central Poland was regulated by provisions imposed by the tsarist
authorities. For further background, see Andrzej Mączyński, The Influence of European
Family Law on the Family Law of Countries Acceding to the EU. The example of Poland,
in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 104, at 239.
181 See DOMINIK LASOK, POLISH FAMILY LAW 92 (A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1968).
182 PERSPECTIVES, supra note 104, at 240–41.
183 See generally KRO.
184 PERSPECTIVES, supra note 104, at 240–41.
185 KRO art.47.
186 LASOK, supra note 181, at 92.
187 See PERSPECTIVES, supra note 104, at 240–41.
188 KRO art. 47 § 1.
189 For further discussion, see LASOK supra note 181, at 89–96.
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choose one of the regimes mentioned in KRO article 47 § 1.190
The spouses cannot introduce any other regime apart from those
regimes authorized by law.191
If spouses do not choose another regime through their
marital agreement, the default statutory regime is limited
community of property,192 similar to that of French law.193 This
means that there are three types of assets in the marriage: the
community property, the separate property of the wife, and the
separate property of the husband. Both spouses own community
property jointly, whether or not the property has been purchased
jointly or separately.194 In this regime, however, spouses cannot
change the rules concerning the management of property.195 This
prohibition is in force for both the standard statutory regime of
community of property and the contractual extended or limited
community of property.196 Spouses are not allowed to modify the
rules of the primary regime and the rules concerning the liability
of spouses.197
This statutory default of limited community of property is
problematic, especially when either one or both of the spouses
decide to start a commercial activity. The rules of management
and liability for debts may make it difficult to be a married
entrepreneur or even a shareholder,198 increasing the importance
of having alternate systems into which spouses may contract by
means of a marital agreement.
If the spouses decide to extend community property through
their marital agreement, however, they are not able to choose
universal community property199 and at least some chattels must
belong to the separate property of each spouse, which is a group
of chattels that cannot be part of community property. These are
enumerated in KRO article 49.200 Spouses are not allowed to

Id.
See id.
For further background on the property system in Poland, as well as on the
separation of property, see Elżbieta Skowrońska-Bocian, Family and Succession Law, in
INTRODUCTION TO POLISH LAW 85, 96–98 (Stanisław Frankowski ed., 2005).
193 Id.
194 Skowrońska-Bocian, supra note 192, at 97.
195 Id. at 98.
196 To contractually expand or limit community property, couples simply designate
more or less of their property as community property. See also infra note 204 and
accompanying text.
197 See, e.g., KRO arts. 41 & 48.
198 For more details, see ANNA STĘPIEŃ-SPOREK, DZIAŁALNOŚĆ GOSPODARCZA Z
UDZIAŁEM MAŁŻONKÓW (2009).
199 In this regime, all property is owned by the wife and husband in common. See
Carroll, supra note 24, at 27.
200 KRO art. 49.
190
191
192
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extend the scope of community property to embrace inalienable
rights, compensations for personal injury, or material damage or
claims for remuneration for work or personal services
outstanding at the time of the marriage.201 If the spouses decide
on a contractual community of property (extended or limited), the
rules of administration of community property from the statutory
regime are applied.202 The agreement may have a provision for
unequal division of common property upon the end of the
regime.203
According to KRO article 47 § 1, spouses may extend or limit
community property,204 or choose separation of property205 or the
sharing of accruals.206 If spouses choose extended or limited
property, they may establish that in the case of the liquidation of
the community of property, the fractions of each spouse will
differ. By choosing the sharing of accruals, spouses may also
change the rules of calculation of accruals.207
Therefore, the marital agreement regulates the spouses’
property during the duration of the chosen agreement. Spouses
are free to conclude different contracts, but only a few of these
are considered marital agreements because they must fulfill
certain conditions. For example, marital agreements must take a
special form in order to be valid: if spouses wish to change their
matrimonial regime (either the statutory standard regime or the
contractual regime), a notary must be involved.208
Contrary to American law, the circumstances regarding the
formation of the marital agreements in Poland are not as
important and are rarely taken into account. For example,
Polish law does not pay significant attention to the fair disclosure
of each spouse’s financial details.209 However, the general rules
concerning defects of a will are applied to marital agreements,
Id.
KRO art. 47.
The end of the community regime is upon divorce, legal separation, nullity of
marriage, the introduction of another property regime, the death of a spouse, or in
situations when the compulsory regime is applied. The compulsory regime is the
separation of property. See Skowrońska-Bocian, supra note 192, at 99.
204 See id. at 98–99.
205 In this regime, spouses hold their property separately.
206 This regime is similar to the German and Swiss statutory accrual system, as well
as to the French deferred community (separation of acquisitions). The general rule of this
regime is that during marriage, each spouse is the sole owner of his or her separate
property. Upon termination of the regime, the surplus of separate property of both
spouses is divided.
For further details, see Anna Stępień-Sporek, Rozdzielność
Majątkowa z Wyrównaniem Dorobków, 7 PAŃSTWO I PRAWO 73 (2008).
207 Anna Stępień-Sporek, Sharing of Accruals as the Best Solution for Marriage?, in
FAMILY FINANCES, supra note 107 at 371, 375.
208 KRO art. 47.
209 See generally KRO.
201
202
203
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i.e., the spouse should not be mistaken, under threat, or in a
state of mind excluding the conscious making or expressing of the
contract.210
In Poland, marital agreements may be concluded by both
spouses and prospective spouses. If the marital agreement is
concluded by prospective spouses, it will not come into force until
they are married. If a prospective spouse or a spouse does not
have full legal capacity, the consent of the legal representative is
necessary, as is the consent of the court.211 However, the marital
agreement may also be concluded by a proxy.212 The form of the
power of attorney is essential. If the marital agreement is to be
concluded by prospective spouses, the name of the other
prospective spouse should not only be mentioned in the document
of the power of attorney, but also given in notarial deed.213
The marital agreement—which takes effect either at the
moment of conclusion or as established by the spouses—can be
changed as often as the spouses desire to change their financial
relationships.214 A similar rule characterizes German and Swiss
law.215
The marital agreement in Poland has effects in relation to
third parties if they are informed of the agreement and of the
regime chosen by the spouses.216 This rule is essential. The
regime can affect creditors, who are protected by the above
mentioned rule. If the spouses have failed to inform third
parties, however, the marital agreement does not have any effect
on these third parties. In practice, this kind of situation is very
common. Third persons who are not aware of the existence of the
marriage contract may assume that the spouses are married
under the statutory system.
In Poland, there is no special requirement to register a
marital agreement,217 however, information about marital
agreements can be published in commercial registers such as the
Krajowy Rejestr Sądowy, the register of companies and stocks, or
Ewidencja Działalności Gospodarczej, the register of individuals
who are entrepreneurs.

210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

See Kodeks cywilny – The Law of 23rd April 1964 – art. 82–88 [hereinafter “Kc”].
See KRO art. 101 § 3.
Skowrońska-Bocian, supra note 192, at 92.
See Kc art. 99 § 1 and KRO art. 47.
KRO art. 47.
See Boele-Woelki, Matrimonial Property Law, supra note 138, at 7–8.
KRO art. 47.
See generally KRO.
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III. A COMPARATIVE STUDY
While European countries may differ slightly in their
approaches to marital agreements, they all differ markedly from
the American approach.218 These various contrasts illustrate the
range of prospective spouses’ possibilities in premarital
contracting, as well as the options that legislatures have in terms
of regulating premarital agreements. A comparison of these
varying approaches to premarital agreements also offers
important insights regarding the contractual autonomy of the
parties, the possible characteristics of premarital agreements,
and the popularity of such agreements.
A. Contractual Autonomy of the Parties
While European matrimonial property law is codified in each
country’s civil code, the American tradition of freedom of contract
provides spouses with the power to contract around state
statutory law on the subject.219 Americans are therefore not
restricted to the property regimes laid out in statutes—whether
community property or equitable distribution—and may contract
around them subject to few limitations by the court.220 In fact,
spouses may even import into their agreements any of the
European property systems, such as a system of accruals.221
Meanwhile, Europeans are often limited to selecting one of the
property regimes statutorily permitted in their countries.
Although this permits them to avoid the statutory default, they
must nonetheless select one of the regimes recognized by law.
Only occasionally may spouses alter the rules of those European
systems.
Americans therefore enjoy more autonomy in
premarital contracting relative to Europeans.
These differing levels of contractual autonomy have differing
consequences. For example, the general notion espoused by
American law is that people should be able to manage their
property as they choose,222 which also justifies the significant

218 Only continental Europe, which abides by the civil law system, differs markedly
from the United States. British common law is similar on this subject. See supra note
107.
219 See, e.g., DeMatteo v. DeMatteo 762 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 2002) (discussing freedom
of contract with regard to American premarital agreements).
220 See supra Part I for further discussion.
221 See supra Part II.
222 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Shaffer, 733 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987):
Because of this new freedom for marital partners to divide their property as
they see fit, the old rule allowing the court to disregard the property division
made by the parties in their [separation] agreement if the division does not
conform to the trial court’s view of an equitable property division, no longer is
appropriate.
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freedom provided to people in the contracting of their wills.223
Furthermore, limited contractual autonomy is criticized as being
paternalistic and less efficient.224 However, one consequence of
such significant contractual autonomy is that American courts
must occasionally find a premarital agreement substantively
unenforceable, particularly when one party’s imaginative
contracting significantly disadvantages the other.
In the
European countries considered, meanwhile, marital agreements
will rarely be substantively or procedurally unenforceable
because they must adhere to strict statutory requirements in the
first place. Furthermore, European spouses cannot introduce
their own regime, but instead must select one of the statutory
systems recognized by the law.
As the Polish approach
illustrates, European courts may therefore be slower to find
procedural defects in marital agreements.225 This may also be
due to the fact that these marital agreements must be concluded
in the presence of the public notary, whose significant role in civil
law countries is much greater than in common law countries.226
Nonetheless, there may be a relationship between
contractual autonomy and the risk of an agreement’s
unenforceability.
In other words, the less formulaic the
premarital agreement, and the less deferential to statutory
defaults, the more opportunity for a judicial declaration of
unenforceability. In the quest for the right legislative framework
to regulate premarital or marital contracting, then, the task
becomes to find the right balance between autonomy and the risk
of unenforceability.
However, complete autonomy may nonetheless be prioritized
because it would permit prospective spouses to choose their own
level of risk regarding the enforceability of their agreements. Of
course, permitting spouses unrestricted contractual autonomy,
thereby allowing them to choose their agreement’s risk of

See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW
206, 223 (Peter Benson ed., Cambridge U. Press 2001) (“Autonomy theories of contract are
based on the concept that allowing an individual to freely own and dispose of property and
freely exercise his will to make choices concerning his person, labor, and property, is a
value that is paramount.”).
223 See, e.g., Trent J. Thornley, Note, The Caring Influence: Beyond Autonomy as the
Foundation of Undue Influence, 71 IND. L.J. 513, 516 (1996) (“The freedom of
testamentary disposition is a basic principle of property law. Though not a constitutional
right, many states recognize freedom of testation as a deeply ingrained tradition in our
society.”). See also supra Part I.D.2.
224 See supra notes 78 and 81.
225 See supra Part II.B.
226 See JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM
30, http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf (last visited
Dec. 28, 2009).
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unenforceability, requires somewhat perfect information.
Prospective spouses must not only know that straying from
formulaic premarital agreements—as well as from typical
legislative defaults—increases their agreements’ risk of
unenforceability, but they must also be aware of the advantages
and disadvantages of choosing particular property regimes and
contractual provisions. A lawyer representing each side could
help assure this.
Another consequence of unbounded autonomy of premarital
contracting, however, is that the courts must continually
determine the enforceability of each individual agreement before
applying its provisions to a divorce. Scarce judicial resources
must therefore be spent, despite the American judiciary’s
traditional reluctance to meddle in family matters.227
Therefore, keeping prospective spouses informed of their
options and expending judicial resources to monitor premarital
agreements are the consequences to a high level of autonomy in
premarital contracting, as illustrated by the American approach
to premarital agreements and a comparison of it to European
approaches.
Nonetheless, every jurisdiction, whether an
American state or an European country, must choose its own
balance among these factors and costs.
B. Potential Characteristics of Premarital Agreements
In searching for an appropriate regulatory framework for
premarital contracting, as well as the proper content of such
agreements, it is instructive to analyze the desirability of the
differing approaches to these agreements, including those that
deal with aspects beyond the freedom of contract already
considered.228
For example, some European countries permit, or even
require, the registration of marital agreements in order to protect
third parties.229 This registration aims to give creditors notice as
to which assets are available for collection. There is a similar
requirement in some American community property states for
the recording of separation of property agreements.230 To give

227 As the courts do not typically become involved in the financial arrangements of
intact families, spouses are permitted to determine their own responsibilities during
marriage. See, e.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d. 885 (Ala. 1958); State v. Rhodes, 61
N.C. 453 (N.C. 1868).
228 See supra Part III.A.
229 See supra Part II for examples and discussion.
230 Carroll, supra note 24, at 32.
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adequate notice to creditors, the agreement binds the spouses
once executed, but binds third-party creditors only if recorded.231
Such registration indeed serves an important, albeit lesserknown, purpose of premarital agreements, which is to organize
how the spouses hold their assets during the marriage. If
spouses hold their property differently from the statutory
default, it may be only fair to give notice of this arrangement to
third parties who potentially rely on the spouses’ property
holdings when extending credit.
A third party would be most disadvantaged by a couple
secretly opting out of a community property default. In such a
case, the third party would ordinarily expect all of the marital
assets to be held by each spouse, when in reality, each spouse
holds smaller assets separately. However as already mentioned,
only a minority of American states utilizes community property
as the default system, whereas some European countries use this
system as their statutory default. Therefore, public registration
of marital agreements is significantly more relevant in the
European context.
Americans, meanwhile, maintain the confidentiality of
premarital agreements.232 This effectively reduces third parties’
ability to rely on such agreements. Such confidentiality also
permits prospective spouses in the United States to contract on
intimate details and on their private financial situations. In this
way, however, American premarital agreements are often limited
to affecting only the married couples who are parties to the
agreements.
Finally, in many European countries, prospective spouses
must adhere to particular formalities in order to conclude a
legally enforceable premarital agreement, such as signing the
agreement in front of a notary.233 There is no such definitive list
of requirements in the United States, although a court may
subsequently analyze the procedural fairness of the agreement
when called upon to enforce the document.234 Such procedural
review may, however, increase the opportunity for the court to
find a premarital agreement unenforceable.235 The level of
required formality will therefore inevitably vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction as each adopts a particular balance between

231
232
233
234
235

See, e.g., id.
Guggenheimer, supra note 30, at 153.
See, e.g., supra note 158 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.D.1.
See supra Part III.A.
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permitting contractual autonomy and protecting the parties from
fraud.
Therefore, choices must be made not only among premarital
contracting options, but also among the different regulatory
frameworks for such agreements. In choosing the appropriate
model, each jurisdiction and couple must therefore weigh the
costs of their choices.
C. Popularity of Premarital Agreements
Premarital agreements are more popular in the United
States than in Europe, but not particularly popular in either.236
There may be several explanations for this current lack of
popularity in premarital contracting on both continents. Many
commentators suspect, however, that the agreements’ popularity
will increase in the near future.237
Importantly, premarital agreements in the United States
might be rare because they need not necessarily be drafted for a
higher income prospective spouse to avoid an unfavorable
statutory default. This is because the higher income earner
would prefer an equitable distribution regime, which often
results in an unequal distribution, rather than a community
property one, which instead results in an equal division of
assets.238
However, most American states use equitable
distribution as the default, mooting the need to alter this regime
through a premarital agreement. Many European countries, on
the other hand, have a statutory default of some type of

236 In the United States, however, the use of premarital agreements tripled between
1978 and 1988 alone. Guggenheimer, supra note 30, at 151. “Although it is difficult to
get statistics on premarital agreements, it appears that 5% to 10% of couples marrying for
the first time and 20% of remarried couples now enter into premarital agreements.”
Brian McDonald, Presentation to the Western Trial Lawyers Association (June 2005)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.spomcman.com/doc/PREMARITAL%20
AGREEMENTS.doc). Meanwhile, only 2% of British couples marrying seek a premarital
agreement. Divorce Lawyers Braced for Busiest Week Ever, TIMES ONLINE, January 5,
2009, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article5450552.ece. In France,
only 10% of spouses conclude a marital agreement, and they do so mostly when important
assets or second marriages are involved. See HAMILTON & PERRY, supra note 100, at 261.
237 “Premarital agreements are gaining popularity as more people become conscious
of the extensive financial rights and obligations arising out of a marriage, and the
increasing statistical chance that any marriage will end in divorce.” In re Marriage of
Leathers, 789 P.2d 263, 265 n.5 (Or. 1990) (quoting 12 ABA Family Advocate, No. 3, 54–
55 (Winter 1990)). See also Jennifer Kim, Contesting the Enforceability of a Premarital
Agreement, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 133, 133 (2000); Jennifer L. McCoy, Comment,
Spousal Support Disorder: An Overview of Problems in Current Alimony Law, 33 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 501, 523 (2005).
238 For further background on the relationship between equitable distribution and
community property regimes and their European counterparts, see Carroll, supra note 24,
at 1.
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community property, which might sooner prompt a higher
income earner to seek a premarital agreement.239
Nonetheless, Americans may use premarital agreements to
regulate many of their rights and responsibilities during
marriage and divorce, particularly in regards to specific assets
they own. Premarital agreements are especially useful to
prospective spouses who fit a particular profile. For example,
people with children from previous marriages may choose to
protect these children’s financial future by virtue of a premarital
agreement.240 People may also utilize such agreements when
they are skeptical of the institution of marriage because of their
own, or their parents’, failed marriages.241
Premarital
agreements may also be more common among prospective
spouses with significant income or age disparities.242 Further,
prospective spouses may choose to keep their property separate
by such agreements so that one can use only his or her portion in
paying off debts.243 Finally, when one partner expects to inherit
significant money or a family business, she may decide to request
a premarital agreement.244
Still, premarital agreements are not frequently used in
either Europe or the United States, with most commentators
estimating that less than 10% of any of these populations use
such agreements.245 In Europe, this may be due to a potential
misunderstanding of the role of the premarital agreement, which
most Europeans associate with American celebrity divorces,246
although the meaning and consequences of premarital
agreements in Europe differ from those in the United States.247
In the United States, meanwhile, the limited use of the
premarital agreement may be due to Americans’ rather
unrealistic sense of optimism regarding their marriages and
their fear of signaling divorce.248 This, as well as the need to

239 However, it is true that premarital agreements are unpopular in Europe, as well.
See supra notes 101, 236 and accompanying text.
240 Guggenheimer, supra note 30, at 152.
241 Id. at 151.
242 Id. at 152.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 See supra note 236.
246 See supra Part II.A. This may also be because the average premarital agreement
is highly confidential. Guggenheimer, supra note 30, at 153.
247 See supra Parts I and II.
248 For the argument that most couples are overly optimistic about their marriages,
see Margaret F. Brinig, FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra note 64, at 276
and Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism
in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733,
757–61 (2008). See also supra note 2.

Do Not Delete

62

2/2/2010 8:15 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 13:27

protect children from a previous marriage,249 may also explain
why many people are more likely to seek premarital agreements
upon second and subsequent marriages. Nonetheless, many
prospective spouses around the world are currently choosing not
to pursue the benefits offered by premarital contracting,
although this may change in the near future.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the premarital agreement permits prospective
spouses around the world to circumvent their jurisdiction’s
judicial and statutory defaults in organizing the terms of their
marriage and potential divorce. To achieve this force in the
United States, the premarital agreement has particularly
undergone significant development over the course of the past
few decades.
Although the American history of the premarital agreement
is relatively short compared to its European counterpart,
Americans have quickly achieved unparalleled levels of freedom
in marital contracting. This heightened freedom of contract has
become one of the most significant differences between the
continental European and American approaches to such
agreements.
Furthermore, a comparative analysis of these various
approaches suggests that the level of autonomy in marital
contracts implicates the risk of the agreement’s unenforceability
by the courts. A comparative study also offers some insights into
improving the regulatory frameworks governing these
agreements, as well as the reasons behind people’s reluctance to
use such agreements.
In conclusion, although the premarital agreement has
attained significant stability and enforceability in countries
around the world, issues surrounding such agreements
undoubtedly remain. Specifically, premarital agreements in the
United States are subject to procedural and substantive review.
They also raise universal public policy issues, particularly in the
case of mobile couples, concerning the meaning of fairness and
the limits on freedom of contract.
As state courts and
legislatures continue to encounter and address these issues, they
may therefore greatly benefit from a comparative study of such
agreements.

249 Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 229, 238–39 (1994).

